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HIV, WOMEN, AND ACCESS TO CLINICAL TRIALS:
TORT LIABILITY AND LESSONS FROM DES
ANNA C. MASTROIANNI*
I.  INTRODUCTION
There is a growing recognition that disease processes, the manifestations of
disease, and physiological responses to treatment sometimes may differ in men
and women.1  Thus, information from clinical studies that either exclude women
or include them in numbers too small to provide meaningful information may be
insufficient to extrapolate to health conditions and disease treatment in women.2
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1. For example, women develop coronary heart disease later than men, and manifest the dis-
ease differently, i.e., most men initially suffer a myocardial infarction while women have uncompli-
cated angina pectoris.  See Jerry H. Gurwitz et al., The Exclusion of the Elderly and Women from Clinical
Trials in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 268 JAMA 1417, 1421 (1992); Nanette K. Wenger et al., Cardio-
vascular Health and Disease in Women, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 247, 248 (1993).  For other examples of
gender differences that may be significant in the understanding of diseases and their treatment, see
COMMITTEE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN CLINICAL
STUDIES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF
INCLUDING WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES 85-95 (Anna C. Mastroianni et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter 1
WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH] (identifying differences due to body size, composition, metabolism,
aging, behavior, psychosocial responses, hormones, the use of exogenous hormones such as hormo-
nal contraceptives and hormone replacement during menopause, and the physiological changes re-
sulting from pregnancy and lactation); Ruth B. Merkatz et al., Women in Clinical Trials of New Drugs:
A Change in Food and Drug Administration Policy, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 292, 292-93 (1993)
(identifying sex-specific issues in drug response).
2. Until recently, women were under-represented in or excluded from research in numerous
settings.  See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 49-67; Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Sin-
gle, White Male for Medical Research, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 24, 24-29 (examining white
males as the prototype for medical research subjects). This failure to include women in study popu-
lations and its impact on women’s health has been well documented in the areas of AIDS and car-
diovascular disease. See, e.g., Ruth Faden et al., Women as Vessels and Vectors: Lessons from the HIV
Epidemic, in FEMINISM & BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 252, 253-70 (Susan M. Wolf ed. 1996)
(discussing the health ramifications of excluding women from AIDS trials); Gurwitz et al., supra note
1, at 1421 (discussing the health ramifications of excluding women from cardiovascular disease tri-
als); Wenger et al., supra note 1, at 248 (same).
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Although many factors may have contributed to the underrepresentation of
women in clinical studies,3 the potential exposure of drug trial sponsors to tort
liability frequently is cited as one of the primary reasons for excluding women
from trials.4  The true source of legal anxiety in the recruitment of female re-
search subjects arises, however, not from a concern for women’s safety, but from
the fear of potential injuries to their offspring.5  Observations and reports of birth
defects in children of women who had been treated with thalidomide or bendec-
3. Some factors that may have influenced decisions to exclude women from research projects
are insensitivity to women’s health issues, lack of representation of women on decisionmaking bod-
ies, gender bias, reliance on the male norm in study design, failure to recognize diversity among the
population of women, and perceived difficulties in recruitment and retention of women subjects.
See generally 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN
CLINICAL STUDIES, WORKSHOP AND COMMISSIONED PAPERS (Anna C. Mastroianni et al. eds., 1994)
[hereinafter 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH].  Earlier federal regulations also contained restric-
tions on women’s participation in research projects.  See FDA Guideline for the Study and Evalua-
tion of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,406, 39,408 (1993)
(“[An earlier FDA guideline] has restricted the early accumulation of information about response to
drugs in women that could be utilized in designing phase 2 and 3 trials, and has perhaps delayed
appreciation of gender-related variation in drug effects.  This early exclusion also may have per-
petuated, in a subtle way, a view of the male as the primary focus of medicine and drug develop-
ment, with women considered secondarily”); see also Nancy E. Kass et al., Harms of Excluding Preg-
nant Women from Clinical Research: The Case of HIV-infected Pregnant Women, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 36,
38-39 (1996) (discussing federal oversight of research involving pregnant women); Vanessa Merton,
The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) from Biomedical Research,
19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369, 390-400 (1993) (discussing federal regulatory constraints on including
women in research).  This Article will not explore the potential for male mediated developmental
toxicity in offspring, as that has not, to the author’s knowledge, proven to be a barrier to men’s ac-
cess to clinical trials.
4. See, e.g., Ellen Flannery & Sanford N. Greenberg, Liability Exposure for Exclusion and Inclusion
of Women as Subjects in Clinical Studies, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 91-102;
Merton, supra note 3, at 400.
5. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Liability Exposure When Offspring Are Injured Because of Their Par-
ents’ Participation in Clinical Trials, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 103, 106-07;
Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 94-96; 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 159-
65; R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us to Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 135, 139-40, 144-46 (1993); Kass et al., supra note 3, at 36-46; Merton, supra note 3, at 400;
Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and Women’s Health Care, 32
HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1259-63 (1996).
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tin brought liability concerns to the forefront. 6  When the courts held manufac-
turers liable for injuries caused to the offspring of women exposed to Diethylstil-
bestrol (DES), it became yet another reason for excluding pregnant women and
women of childbearing age from clinical trials.7
The failure to include adequate numbers of women in clinical studies of
HIV and AIDS has had a significant impact on the health and welfare of women
afflicted with the disease.8  In addition, proponents of the inclusion of women
claim that women’s underrepresentation endangers not only the health of each
individual woman denied the opportunity to participate, but also jeopardizes the
6. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301, 313-21 (1992) (describing drugs, their uses, and effects).  Thalidomide was pre-
scribed as a sedative in Europe during the late 1950s and early 1960s.  See id. at 313.  The children of
pregnant women who were given the drug frequently suffered severe birth defects, including “arm
and leg deformities.”  Id.  FDA approval to market thalidomide for use in the United States ulti-
mately was withheld because of these and other reports of harmful effects in humans.  Recently,
however, alternative uses of thalidomide are being considered.  See FDA Moves on Thalidomide, 350
LANCET 1086 (1997).  Bendectin was used as an anti-nausea drug for pregnant women from the mid
1950s through the 1970s.  See Sanders, supra, at 317.  Despite a 1980 report by the FDA’s Fertility and
Maternal Health Drug Advisory Committee that the drug had no teratogenic effects, it was blamed
for a wide variety of birth defects, including “limb reductions.”  Id. at 318.  In response to multiple
product liability suits, the manufacturer, Merrell Dow, withdrew the drug from the market in 1983;
because most states have lengthy statutes of limitations regarding childhood disability, the company
continues to fight legal actions today.  See id. at 319-20.  Merrell Dow recently reported that only one
verdict against the company remains and it is on appeal on the grounds that the scientific evidence
does not support the verdict.  See Merrell Dow Wins Reversal in Texas Bendectin Case, NAT’L L.J., Aug.
18, 1997, at A12.  Neither of these drugs resulted in reported research injury cases.
7. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 40 (“[P]roblems caused by . . . diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES) . . . would amplify public sentiment about the need for greater protection for fetuses
. . . .”).
8. Existing data indicate that women’s participation in AIDS clinical drug trials has been low.
See 62 Fed. Reg. 49,946, 49,947 n.1 (1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) (“As of January 1992,
14,799 participants were enrolled in U.S. AIDS Clinical Trial Group studies sponsored by the Na-
tional Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, of whom only 1,151 were adult women.  In 1993,
21,598 participants were enrolled, while only 1,952 were adult women.” (citations omitted)); Faden
et al., supra note 2, at 252-53 (noting that until recently the research examining HIV and AIDS in
women focused on women’s potential to infect others “either as sexual partners . . . or as gestators”
and that “[t]he health interests of women themselves largely were ignored . . . result[ing] in harm to
women.”).  Furthermore,
[t]he delay in examining how AIDS manifests itself in women has resulted in women’s
conditions being conspicuously absent from the list of conditions defined by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to constitute AIDS, and this in turn has resulted
in the denial of benefit and treatment programs to women. . . .  [I]n clinical trials of AIDS
drugs, which often may provide significant sources of first-rate medical care and access to
experimental treatment for persons with AIDS, the numbers of women participating lags
behind expectations for a disease that is increasing the most rapidly among women.
. . . [W]here women have been the focus of clinical research the primary research ques-
tion has been how to reduce or prevent a vertical transmission of [HIV] from a pregnant
woman to a fetus or newborn, not how to treat the female-specific manifestations of HIV
diseases. . . .  [U]ntil very recently there has been almost no research explaining the
mechanisms of male-to-female transmission of HIV and little research directed at the de-
velopment of anti-viricidal [sic] preparations that could be used by women to reduce their
chances of contracting the infection through sexual activity.
1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 66; see generally GENA COREA, THE INVISIBLE
EPIDEMIC: THE STORY OF WOMEN AND AIDS (1992) (discussing how excluding women from clinical
studies results in little available information on how HIV affects women).
MASTRO 06/10/98  10:12 AM
170 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 5:167 1998
health of their potential offspring.9  In light of the growing number of AIDS cases
in women between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four,10 it is critical that the
health needs of this subgroup, which encompasses women of childbearing age
and pregnant women, be addressed and that this population not be denied the
benefits of research.11
Recently, pregnant women have served as subjects in clinical trials of AZT.12
The federal government, stimulated by the AIDS crisis in women, has intro-
duced guidelines and proposals to encourage the inclusion of women of child-
9. See Nancy Kass, Gender and Research, in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH
(Jeffrey Kahn et al. eds., forthcoming 1998) (noting that work in maternal epilepsy, asthma, diabetes,
and HIV all demonstrate that a fetus that develops in a maternal environment that is relatively
healthy has a much better outcome and prognosis than a fetus that develops in the context of uncon-
trolled maternal disease); see also JACK A. PRITCHARD ET AL., WILLIAM’S OBSTETRICS 257 (18th ed.
1989) (noting that good prenatal care benefits both the baby and mother); Kass et al., supra note 3, at
37 (discussing the inclusion of HIV-positive women in clinical research); Merton, supra note 3, at
377-79 (discussing the immediate benefits from research that women do not get because they are
excluded); Rothenberg, supra note 5, at 1208-09 (discussing gender gaps in clinical research).
10. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Update:
Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection Among Persons Aged 25-44 Years—United States, 1994, 45
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 121, 123 fig.2 (1996); see also Pascale M. Wortley & Patricia L.
Fleming, AIDS in Women in the United States: Recent Trends, 278 JAMA 911, 911 (1997).  In 1993, AIDS
became the fourth leading cause of death in women between the ages of 25 and 44.  See id.
11. While lawyers and research project administrators may concentrate on the risks posed by
the research, potential research subjects focus on the perceived benefits of experimental therapies
and often choose to participate despite the risks.  See Nancy E. Kass et al., Trust: The Fragile Founda-
tion of Contemporary Biomedical  Research, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 25, 25-27.  This is
especially true for those suffering from life-threatening illnesses, such as AIDS.  See Mary Beth
Caschetta et al., FDA Policy on Women in Drug Trials, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1815, 1815 (1993) (“In the
particular context of AIDS, clinical trials often provide the only access to life-saving therapies for
women . . . .”); Merton, supra note 3, at 377-79; see generally Kass, supra note 9, at 173-74 (manuscript
pages) (arguing that women as individuals and as a group are denied benefits if excluded from
clinical research).
12. See, e.g., Martha F. Rogers at al., Reducing the Risk of Prenatal HIV Transmission Through Zido-
vudine Therapy: Treatment Recommendations and Implications, 50 J. AM. MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N 78 (1995)
(reviewing the results of a clinical trial that administered zidovudine, commonly known as AZT, to
HIV-infected pregnant women and their newborns).  Many of the HIV and AIDS research projects
that recruit women as study participants have focused not on the amelioration of women’s health
conditions, but rather on the transmission of the disease by HIV-infected pregnant women to their
offspring.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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bearing age in clinical trials. 13  Are sponsors of these trials exposing themselves
to the possibility of tort liability similar to that associated with DES?  Or, has the
tort liability barrier to the inclusion of women of childbearing age in clinical tri-
als been broken?  The purpose of this Article is to examine the tort liability expe-
rience with DES,  compare it to the recent and ongoing trials of AZT in pregnant
women, and extract lessons that can be used to mitigate against the likelihood of
tort liability and to encourage the inclusion of women of childbearing age in
clinical trials.
Part II of this Article discusses potential theories of tort liability for re-
search-related injury.  Part III briefly explores two countervailing aspects of tort
liability related to women’s participation in clinical trials:14 (A) liability exposure
resulting from injury to the offspring born of women who participated in clinical
trials (that is, liability for inclusion of pregnant women and women of child-
bearing age); and (B) liability exposure resulting from injuries to a population as
a result of the failure to test the product in that population (that is, liability for
exclusion of women, or a subset of women).  The analysis focuses particularly on
the liability exposure of the clinical trial’s sponsor because the sponsor wields
considerable influence in the selection of the subject population and is likely to
bear the substantial financial burden of liability.  Part IV of the Article discusses
the implications of the cases that arose out of the research and clinical use of DES
on tort liability considerations for HIV and AIDS treatment research in women of
childbearing age.  Specific comparisons are made to current research and clinical
use of AZT by pregnant women to prevent perinatal transmission of HIV to off-
spring.15  Part V details the lessons that should be learned from the liability expe-
rience with DES when examining the tort liability barrier to women’s inclusion
in clinical trials.  The Article concludes with recommendations for mitigating tort
13. See NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Re-
search, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508, 14,509 (1994) (requiring the inclusion of women in all National Institutes
of Health supported research and stating that “[w]omen of childbearing potential should not be rou-
tinely excluded” from research participation); see also 62 Fed. Reg. 49,946 (1997).  The FDA, for ex-
ample, acknowledged its potential role in the exclusion of women from clinical research and re-
cently proposed a rule to ensure that women of childbearing potential with life-threatening diseases
will not be excluded automatically from research studies.  See 62 Fed. Reg. 49,947 (1997).  Under this
proposed regulation, the FDA could place a clinical hold on a study if women (or men) with repro-
ductive potential are excluded because of the trial sponsor’s fear of risks to reproduction or potential
offspring.  See 62 Fed. Reg. 49,951.  This proposed rule follows the recommendations of both the Na-
tional Task Force on AIDS Drug Development and the Presidential Advisory Council on Human
Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.  See id.  It also reflects the rec-
ommendations of the Institute of Medicine Committee on Ethical and Legal Issues of Including
Women in Clinical Studies.  See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 193 (“[T]he poten-
tial or prospect of becoming pregnant during the study may not be used as a justification for pre-
cluding or limiting participation.”).
14. For a full exploration of tort liability issues related to women’s inclusion and exclusion in
clinical studies, see Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 91-102; 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH,
supra note 1, at 150-67; Merton, supra note 3, at 400-28; see also Clayton, supra note 5, at 103-10;
Charo, supra note 5, at 144-49 (discussing the product liability fears of researchers); Rothenberg, su-
pra note 5, at 1259-65 (discussing tort liability both for exclusion from, and inclusion in, research).
15. The perinatal transmission of HIV to offspring is referred to as “vertical transmission.”  See
Joe Rhatigan et al., Rereading Public Health, in WOMEN, POVERTY, AND AIDS: SEX, DRUGS, AND
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 207, 223 (Paul Farmer et al. eds., 1996) (“Vertical transmission [of HIV] from
mother to child has been a topic of much study in public health research.”).
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liability exposure for the inclusion of women of childbearing age and pregnant
women in clinical trials, including a discussion of the need for early adverse
event detection and improved informed consent processes.
II.  RESEARCH-RELATED INJURIES AND TORT LIABILITY
Very little information exists regarding liability claims for research inju-
ries.16  This paucity of available data is at least partly a product of a low inci-
dence of such injuries.17  The lack of information also may reflect the reality of
legal actions—that whether meritorious or not, actions often are settled or simply
are not reported.18  Whatever the reasons, only a very small body of case law ex-
ists relating to research injuries.19
Three theories of tort recovery potentially are applicable to a claim of re-
search injury: battery, negligence, and strict liability.20  The first, battery, is an
intentional and unlawful bodily contact upon another person without that per-
son’s consent.21  In the research context, a battery action could arise if an individ-
16. See Wendy K. Mariner, Compensation for Research Injuries, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RE-
SEARCH, supra note 3, at 117-18; 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES: A
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURIES CAUSED BY
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 2, 101 (1982) [hereinafter 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N]
(concluding that there is insufficient data to fully resolve the question of redress for research inju-
ries); 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 151.
17. See Mariner, supra note 16, at 118 (noting the “incidence of serious injury and the absolute
numbers of people seriously injured are small”); 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 16, at 65 (noting
that “the incidence of serious injury and the absolute numbers of people seriously injured are
small”); 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 152 (“[T]here are few reported cases of
research-related injury . . . .”); see also Phillippe V. Cardon et al., Injuries to Research Subjects: A Survey
of Investigators, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 650, 651 (1976) (discussing a 1975 survey of principal investi-
gators that found only about four percent of research participants had been injured, with less than
one percent of those suffering permanently disabling or fatal injuries).
18. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 151; see also COMMITTEE ON CON-
TRACEPTIVE DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL & INSTITUTE OF MED., DEVELOPING NEW
CONTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 118-46 (Luigi Mastroianni, Jr. et al. eds., 1990)
(discussing products liability litigation in the context of the development of new contraceptives).
19. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 151; Rothenberg, supra note 5, at 1242.
20. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 153 (“The three legal bases for a legal
action for research injury are battery, negligence, and strict liability.”).  Although the focus of this
Article is sponsor liability, other defendants in a legal action arising out of a research injury may be
the institution at which the trial is being conducted and the researcher or physician who provided
the drug.  See Clayton, supra note 5, at 106.  In the case of injury to offspring, even a parent could be
named as a defendant.  See id. at 105-06.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (“An actor is subject to liability to another
for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the
other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact
with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”); see also Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329,
335-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a battery complaint against a hospi-
tal and a male nurse for their failure to honor her religious beliefs against being seen unclothed by a
male).
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ual were used as a research subject without her knowledge or consent.22  Both
compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded for battery.23
The second theory, negligence, requires the plaintiff to prove that the de-
fendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care, that the defendant breached that
duty, that the plaintiff suffered an injury, and that the injury was caused by the
breach of the defendant’s duty.24  The duties owed to a research subject include
the duty to provide adequate information about the potential risks of a research
project25 and the duty to conduct and to monitor research properly.26  Negligence
actions in the research context likely would raise issues concerning the duty to
provide the study subject with informed consent.27  The plaintiff is required to
present evidence of the standard of care for informed consent (that is, what con-
stitutes reasonable disclosure under the circumstances), that the defendant
breached this standard, that the research subject would not have chosen to par-
ticipate in the research project if she had known about an undisclosed risk, and
that the risk caused her injury.28  Negligence awards are compensatory, although
in the case of extreme, or “gross” negligence, plaintiffs also may recover punitive
damages,29 and third parties sometimes recover damages for loss of consortium.30
The third theory of tort recovery, strict liability, does not require the plain-
tiff to prove the defendant’s negligence.31  While the second Restatement of Torts
suggests that a manufacturer may be strictly liable if a product is sold “in a de-
22. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding that
women who were given DES as a part of a medical experiment alleged sufficient lack of consent to
the treatment involved to state a claim of battery); see also 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra
note 1, at 153 (“The most common application of negligence in the area of research injury is lack of
informed consent.”).
23. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 40-41 (5th ed.
1984); see also Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1182-83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (reversing
the trial court’s decision to strike plaintiff’s request for punitive damages on a battery claim when an
electric company knowingly exposed the plaintiff to high levels of radiation).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 30, at 164-
65.
25. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(2) (1997); see also Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 349-51 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that a physician’s duty, absent “exceptional circumstances,” includes obtaining in-
formed consent).
26. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.50 (1997) (requiring manufacturers to provide proper monitoring to en-
sure research is conducted in accord with accepted standards and study protocol).
27. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 32, at 189-93; see also Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4,
at 92; 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 155-57.
28. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, §32, at 191.
29. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 2, at 9-15.
30. See id. § 125, at 931-33. “Loss of consortium” refers to the harm derived from losing the
“sexual attentions, society, and affection” of a spouse who is injured or killed.  Id.  In addition, ex-
isting children whose parent is injured in a clinical trial might bring a loss of consortium claim.  See
id. § 125, at 935-36; Merton, supra note 3, at 413 (noting that “a researcher could face a loss of consor-
tium claim from an already existing child whose parent was injured participating in the research”
(citation omitted)).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc.,  377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (“To establish the manufacturer’s liability it was sufficient
that [the] plaintiff moved that he was injured while using [the product] in a way it was intended to
be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which [the] plaintiff was not aware that
made [the product] unsafe for its intended use.”).
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fective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer,”32 it also pro-
vides that drug manufacturers will not be liable as long as the drug, including
those that are “new or experimental,” is “properly prepared and marketed, and
a proper warning is given.”33  The rationale for this caveat rests on an acknowl-
edgment that the therapeutic benefits of drugs outweigh known and reasonable
risks.34  The newly-adopted third Restatement of Torts: Products Liability clarifies
the circumstances under which prescription drug and medical device manufac-
turers will be held strictly liable for harm caused by their products.35  Under sec-
tion 6 of the third Restatement of Torts, a “manufacturer of a prescription drug or
medical device who sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical
device is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the defect.”36  A prod-
uct may be deemed defective because of a “manufacturing defect,”37 or because
the product is not reasonably safe due to design38 or inadequate instructions or
warnings of foreseeable risks of harm.39  The product must be defective at the
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Abbott Lab. v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170,
176 (7th Cir. 1935) (holding a drug manufacturer liable where the drug was “in a dangerous condi-
tion at the time it was used [on the plaintiff and] . . . that condition could have caused the injury”);
Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 1925) (holding that “an act of negligence of a
manufacturer or vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of mankind . . . and in-
tended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life is actionable”).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).  In clarifying what is not an
“unreasonably dangerous” product, comment k includes
many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of pu-
rity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.  The seller of such products, again
with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning
is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk.
Id.; see also Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (finding manufacturers of
experimental drugs are not strictly liable when an adequate warning is provided).
34. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts: A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 473 (1196) (noting that rationale for
comment k was to ensure that  “the right [drugs] would  reach the right patients” even though they
might unavoidably cause harm).
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 1, 1997).
36. Id. § 6(a). A retail seller or other distributor may be subject to liability under certain condi-
tions as well.  See id. § 6(e).
37. Id. § 2(a) (“[A] product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product . . . .”).
38. See id. § 6(c) (“A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective
design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in
relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health care providers, knowing of such
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any
class of patients.”).
39. See id. § 6(d) (“[R]easonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm
[must be] provided to: (1) prescribing and other health care providers who are in a position to re-
duce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or (2) the patient when the
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health care providers will not be in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”).
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time of sale or distribution for strict liability principles to apply.40  Unlike the
strict liability limitation in the second Restatement of Torts, the newly-revised sec-
tion and its accompanying notes do not address expressly liability for drugs used
in the research context.41  Case law prior to the adoption of the third Restatement,
however, suggests that the inclusion of the term “distributes” as an alternative to
“sells” covers the use of drugs in the research context.42
III.  COUNTERVAILING ASPECTS OF TORT LIABILITY RELATED TO WOMEN’S
PARTICIPATION IN CLINICAL TRIALS43
A.  Tort Liability for Inclusion of Women of Childbearing Age in Clinical Trials
The informed consent process is a central feature in how research is con-
ducted today.44  This concept requires the disclosure of all facts “necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treat-
ment.”45  From a clinical trial sponsor’s perspective, the informed consent process
not only preserves the autonomous decisionmaking of potential subjects, but also
40. See id. § 6(b) (“For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a drug or medical device is de-
fective if at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical device: (1) contains a manufac-
turing defect as defined in § 2(a); or (2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in
Subsection (c); or (3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings as defined in
Subsection (d).”).
41. See id. § 6; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (expressly addressing
drugs produced for “experiment”).
42. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting manufacturer’s ar-
gument that strict liability would not apply to an experimental drug because the drug was not sold).
43. The discussion herein focuses on liability for prenatal injuries, which are injuries that are
alleged to have occurred to a fetus in existence at the time of the woman’s ingestion of an experi-
mental drug.  These injuries could arise as a result of the participation of an already pregnant
woman or a woman who became pregnant during the trial.  Preconception liability—where the fetus
is not in existence at the time of drug ingestion, but is alleged to have been injured—is outside the
scope of this Article.  It is worth noting, however, that courts have been extremely reluctant in the
non-research context to allow cases of preconception liability in drug administration, as a claim
would have to be made that a duty existed to a person who did not legally exist.  Causation in such
a case is extremely difficult to prove.  See Merton, supra note 3, at 404-13.  Rejection of this sort of
claim is evidenced in the dismissal of third generation DES cases, where grandchildren of women
who took DES allege injury.  See, e.g., Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510 (10th Cir. 1994); Loerch v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 445 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1989) (en banc); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198
(N.Y. 1991); Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992).  But see Tracey I. Batt, DES Third-
Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1217, 1248 (1996) (examining the rela-
tionship between the doctrine of proximate cause generally and third-generation DES cases and
suggesting recovery should sometimes be permitted).  Like prenatal injuries, however, it is possible
for a child born alive, or its parent, to recover for damages arising from preconceptual negligent or
intentional conduct.  See Merton, supra note 3, at 404 n.153.
44. All federally regulated or sponsored research must include informed consent of the human
subject.  See 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003, 28,016-17 (1991); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20, .27 (1997).  In addition, all re-
search conducted at institutions holding a Multiple Project Assurance granted by the federal gov-
ernment must conform to the federal regulations on informed consent.  See 56 Fed. Reg. 28,014
(1991).
45. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).  For a full
exploration of the development of the concept of informed consent, see generally RUTH R. FADEN &
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (providing an historical
and conceptual overview of informed consent).
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minimizes the sponsor’s liability exposure for research injuries.46  Specifically, a
research subject may state a claim for battery by establishing that she never con-
sented or knew of her participation in the study.  If her initial consent were se-
cured without adequate disclosure of risks, she may raise a claim of negligence.47
If risks were known to, or were foreseeable by, the sponsor but not disclosed to
the subject, the subject then could bring a strict liability action.48
The success of claims brought by, or on behalf of, offspring who were in-
jured as a result of a mother’s participation in research is less clear, because an
unborn child does not have the capacity to consent to participation.49  This ap-
pears to be the basis of sponsors’ fear of liability for including pregnant women
and women of childbearing age in clinical trials,50 raising the questions of
whether a mother’s consent to participate in a clinical trial immunizes the spon-
sor against tort liability for harm to offspring and whether a woman can consent
to research risks on behalf of her fetus.51
Only three reported cases involve alleged research injuries to offspring as a
result of a woman’s participation in a clinical study, and in all three cases the re-
search subjects were pregnant women.  Two of the cases concerned the experi-
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 1,
1997) (“Failure to instruct or warn is the major basis of liability for manufacturers of prescription
drugs and medical devices.”).
47. See Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 92 (noting that in a negligence action, the plaintiff
must show “that he or she was not given the information that should have been given and that this
lack of informed consent caused the plaintiff’s injury”).
48. See id. at 93 (noting that manufacturers of products deemed “unavoidably unsafe” will not
be held strictly liable for injuries caused by those products when they provide adequate warning);
Charo, supra note 5, at 148 (noting that under strict liability, “a manufacturer can try to insulate itself
from liability by giving adequate warning.”); Theresa McGovern et al., Inclusion of Women in AIDS
Clinical Research: A Political and Legal Analysis, 49 J. AM. MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N 102, 104 (1994)
(suggesting that drug trial sponsors would not be held strictly liable for effects of experimental
drugs provided that adequate warning is given and informed consent is obtained).
49. Outside the scope of this Article is the question of whether a federal policy promoting the
inclusion of women in clinical trials would preempt state tort law claims.  One could make a policy
argument for such a defense from the majority’s dicta in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991), which argued that the federal policy promoting equal access to the workplace articulated in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might preempt state tort claims by a child whose mother was
exposed to lead in the workplace.  See id. at 209-10.  Given the Supreme Court’s refusal to find pre-
emption except in cases where Congress explicitly intends to preempt state law or where there is a
direct conflict between state and federal law, however, it is highly unlikely that a state tort claim for
prenatal or preconceptual injury as a result of the mother’s participation in clinical research will be
preempted by federal law.  See Clayton, supra note 5, at 103-04.  For a general discussion of federal
preemption, see Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption of Common Law Tort Awards by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 509 (1996).
50. See Charo, supra note 5, at 146 (noting that pharmaceutical manufacturers’ “nervousness
stems from the fact that [a] child could bring suit as a result of birth defects, since the general rule is
that parents cannot waive causes of action on behalf of their children, and virtually all jurisdictions
allow tort claims for prenatal injuries provided the child is born alive”).
51. Phrasing the question in this way ignores the possibility that fetal effects may result from
male research participation.  There is a small but growing body of researchers who recognize the
potential for male-mediated developmental toxicity.  See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra
note 1, at 179-81 (discussing how male toxicity can contribute to adverse pregnancy outcomes).
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mental use of DES,52 and the third involved the ingestion of radioactive iron.53  As
discussed below, none of the pregnant women in these cases were given the op-
portunity to consent to participate in the study, nor were they informed that they
were being used as research subjects.
DES is a synthetic hormone that was prescribed widely to pregnant women
from the 1940s through 1971 to prevent miscarriage.54  Twenty years after its first
use, researchers discovered that some of the daughters of the women who had
taken the drug had developed a rare form of vaginal cancer.55  By that time, at
least 1.5 million offspring had been exposed to DES, and hundreds of claims
arose against the manufacturers who had produced the drug.56
In the early 1950s, large controlled clinical trials of DES were conducted on
pregnant women at the University of Chicago, which led to the cases of alleged
research-related injury.57  Both cases were brought after the discovery of the car-
cinogenic potential of DES in offspring of women who had been given DES.58  In
Mink v. University of Chicago,59 three women, on behalf of themselves and ap-
proximately one thousand women who had participated in the trials, alleged in-
jury, as well as increased risk of injury, to their daughters.60  In Wetherill v. Uni-
52. See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 570 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (concerning women
who contracted cancer that they attributed to DES administered in a medical research project to
their mothers while pregnant); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(involving pregnant women who were given DES as a part of a medical research project).
53. See Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 940 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (involving pregnant
women who were the unconsenting subjects of experiments involving radioactive isotopes).
54. See Karen Weitzner & Harold L. Hirsh, Diethylstilbestrol-Medicolegal Chronology, 28 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 145, 146-49 (1982).
55. See Arthur L. Herbst et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol
Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 NEW ENG. J.  MED. 878 (1971).
56. For examples of these cases, see Payton v. Abbott Laboratory, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979),
vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) (certifying a class action brought by women with an in-
creased risk of cancer because of DES exposure, though the order certifying the class was later va-
cated); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratory, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (holding manufacturers of DES liable
in proportion to their market share even though there was no evidence that they had produced the
actual DES to which the plaintiffs were exposed); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 730
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (dismissing a case brought by a woman who had been exposed to DES in utero);
Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), quashed, 397 So. 2d
1221 (Fla. 1981) (dismissing the action of a mother who had taken DES and the claim of her daughter
who had been exposed to DES in utero for failing to bring the action within the statute of limita-
tions); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), modified, 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich.
1984) (allowing the claim of the plaintiffs, who had been exposed to DES in utero, to go forward);
Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 406 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (dismissing
action against a broker of DES); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980) (shifting the burden of exculpation to the DES manufacturers).  For a brief analysis of claims
involving DES, see Weitzner & Hirsh, supra note 54, at 158-68; Romvaldo P. Eclavea, Annotation,
Products Liability: Diethylstilbestrol (DES), 2 A.L.R.4th 1091 (1980).
57. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see also Wetherill v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 570 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
58. See Weitzner & Hirsh, supra note 54, at 147-51.
59. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
60. See id. at 715.  They also alleged injury to themselves and to their sons, and asked for class
action certification.  See id. at 715-16.  The relationship between DES and cancer became known to
the medical community in 1971, and the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made no effort to no-
tify the plaintiffs of their participation in the experiment until 1975 or 1976.  See id. at 715.
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versity of Chicago, the plaintiffs were two daughters who had contracted cancer
that they attributed to the DES that was administered to their mothers while they
were pregnant.61  In both Mink and Wetherill the plaintiffs claimed that the
women taking DES never knew that they were participating in an experiment or
that they were even taking DES.62
In the hearing in Mink on whether the case brought by the mothers against
the manufacturer and the institution conducting the research should be dis-
missed, the court held that the manufacturers had a duty to notify the women
about the risks posed by DES at the time when the company became aware of
them or should have become aware of them.63  The court permitted the battery
allegations against the University of Chicago to stand, stating that non-
emergency treatment performed without consent or knowledge raises a claim of
battery.64  The case was settled with financial compensation to the plaintiffs and
an agreement by the University of Chicago to provide medical services to
women in the trials and to their offspring.65  In Wetherill, the court permitted the
daughters to bring an action against the manufacturer and the University of Chi-
cago.66  This case also settled, although the terms of the settlement were undis-
closed.
Finally, a recent decision denied a motion to dismiss a claim of research in-
juries to offspring resulting from a clinical study of radioactive iron isotopes, re-
ferred to as Section B of the Tennessee Vanderbilt Nutrition Project.  In Craft v.
Vanderbilt University, the plaintiffs included both pregnant women and their off-
spring who brought an action against the organizations that sponsored the
study, conducted by Vanderbilt University.67  While receiving prenatal care at
Vanderbilt in the late 1940s, over 800 pregnant women were given radioactive
iron as a part of a study to trace iron absorption in pregnant women.68  The
plaintiffs maintained that they were never informed of the radioactive nature of
the study or the risks of drinking the “vitamin drink” or “cocktail,” or given the
opportunity to refuse to participate in the research study.69  The plaintiffs alleged
61. 570 F. Supp. 1124, 1125 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
62. See id. at 1126-27; Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 715.
63. See Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 720.  Although the court found a duty to notify, it dismissed the
claims of breach of duty to warn and strict liability under Illinois tort law because the women cited
risk of injury and actual injury to their offspring rather than physical injury to themselves.  See id. at
719-20.
64. See id. at 715-18. Because the trial sponsors allegedly did not obtain any consent, informed
consent was not at issue; if it had been, a claim of negligence would have been raised.  See id. at 716.
65. See Caroline E. Mayer, Getting Personal on Product Liability; Two Lawmakers’ Opposing Views
Stem From Their Own Painful Experiences, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1995, at D1.
66. See Wetherill, 570 F. Supp. at 1124-31 (holding that certain expert testimony would be admis-
sible at trial, thereby implicitly permitting plaintiffs’ claims to go forward).  The plaintiffs based their
legal claims on battery, strict liability, breach of duty to warn, lack of informed consent, and other
negligence theories.  See id. at 1125-26.
67. 940 F. Supp. 1185, 1185-88 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).  The defendants in the case were Vanderbilt
University and the Rockefeller Foundation.  See id. at 1189.
68. See id. at 1188-89; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, THE
HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS: FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RA-
DIATION EXPERIMENTS 213-16 (1996).
69. See Craft, 940 F. Supp. at 1189.
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that the risk of radiation was known at the time the iron was administered, and
that the results of a follow-up study conducted in the 1960s that indicated a high
risk of cancer from the radioactive iron were never revealed to the study partici-
pants.70  The court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment.71
These cases are instructive because the courts permitted actions in battery
where offspring were injured as a result of their mothers’ participation in re-
search; these cases did not involve informed consent, however, because none of
the women allegedly consented to participate in the research.  Thus, these cases
do not establish or identify the boundaries of liability for injuries to offspring
when a woman properly has consented to participate in a clinical trial.
There is, however, some support in federal regulations and in non-research-
related case law concerning risks of injury to offspring for the argument that the
informed consent of the mother will be sufficient to shield the sponsor from li-
ability.  Analysis of those sources suggests that the purpose of the clinical trial
may be important in determining whether the sponsor will be liable, that is,
whether or not the trial drug is intended to benefit the health of the mother, the
fetus, both, or neither.  Roberts v. Patel72 explicitly recognized a mother’s ability to
consent to medical treatment for an unborn fetus.73  Roberts appears to indicate
that when the drug is intended to benefit the health of the fetus, when no negli-
gence is involved, and when the informed consent of the woman is obtained
(including a warning about the potential for risks to the fetus), the drug manu-
facturer will not be held liable for offspring injury.74
Federal regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services over twenty years ago, and supported by an ethical analysis by
a national bioethics commission,75 suggest that under certain circumstances it
may be acceptable to perform research with pregnant women where the trial
drug is intended solely to benefit the mother’s health. 76  The regulations provide
that research on pregnant women can be approved “where the purpose of the
activity is to meet the health needs of the mother and the fetus will be placed at
risk only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs.”77  The regula-
tions also require that informed consent include the possible impact of the re-
search on the fetus.78  In the same way compliance with FDA regulations is evi-
70. See id. at 1190.
71. See id. at 1198.  In November, 1996, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could proceed as a
class against Vanderbilt University.  See Legal Issues: Class Action Approved in Radiation Experiment
Case, CANCER WKLY. PLUS, Dec. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11464247.
72. 620 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
73. See id. at 324-25 (stating “[t]his court is at a loss to say who may consent to the treatment of
an unborn fetus if not the unborn fetus’ parent”).
74. See id. at 325.
75. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, NO. 76-127-128 RESEARCH ON THE FETUS (1975).
76. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.207 (1997).
77. 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(a)(1).
78. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(b).  Commentators have noted that some of the provisions of this
regulation are outdated, including its requirement of paternal consent.  See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH
RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 197; Merton, supra note 3, at 397 n.132.  As of this writing, the federal
regulations relating to research on pregnant women are under review.
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dence of a manufacturer’s reasonableness in marketing a drug; these regulations
and the work of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research might be used to provide evidence for
the standard of conduct of a reasonable researcher.79  Following this reasoning,
the best case for mitigating liability would be if the research subject were a preg-
nant woman with a life-threatening illness, if the woman is appropriately ad-
vised of the foreseeable risks to her and to her fetus (based on existing scientific
information, including animal studies), and if the woman has no other known
alternatives.  This argument therefore would not support a protocol that poses
very serious risks to the unborn child and offers little prospect of medical benefit
to the woman.
Dicta in a 1991 Supreme Court employment discrimination case may pro-
vide additional support for asserting that the informed consent of the woman
will preclude the imposition of liability.  In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,80 the
company’s argument for excluding women (whether pregnant or not) from jobs
with potentially high levels of lead exposure was based on a fear of injury to
potential children.81  The Court rejected this justification for exclusion, support-
ing instead the autonomous decisionmaking authority of the pregnant or poten-
tially-pregnant woman.82  The Court commented that “[i]f, under general tort
principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the employer fully
informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the
basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at best.”83
79. See Malek v. Lederle Labs., 466 N.E.2d 1038, 1039-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that a jury
may consider compliance with FDA regulations as evidence of reasonableness but it cannot be taken
as conclusive).  But see Baldino v. Castagna, 454 A.2d 1012, 1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), rev’d on other
grounds, 478 A.2d 807 (Pa. 1984) (“While compliance with a law or regulation relieves the actor from
liability under a theory of negligence per se, it does not establish, as a matter of law, that the actor
exercised reasonable care.”).  Generally, however, compliance with FDA regulations in marketing a
drug is not dispositive and cannot exempt or immunize a manufacturer from state tort liability.  See
Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that “FDA approval is not a shield to
liability”); Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that
federal law did not preempt state common-law liability for defective design or failure to warn); Os-
burn v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that federal statute and
regulations on labeling did not preempt Texas law the on duty to warn); Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742
F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that compliance with FDA regulation does not preempt
state tort liability); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985) (holding
that a manufacturer’s compliance with FDA guidelines does not necessarily shield it from state tort
liability for failing to provide adequate warnings).  When an FDA requirement specifically prohibits
a manufacturer from acting without FDA approval, however, compliance with FDA’s strictures may
preempt a state tort claim.  See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 288, 306-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1983), rev’d, 592 A.2d 1176 (N.J. 1991) (holding that federal law did not clearly require FDA ap-
proval prior to a label change and thus did not preempt state law).
80. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
81. See id. at 191-92.
82. See id. at 206-07, 211.  The recommendations of the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on the
Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies support the auton-
omy of all women, including pregnant women, to make decisions about participation in research
and the health of their offspring.  See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 194-98.
83. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 208. An argument can be made that the employment discrimi-
nation case is distinguishable because the holding is based on the interpretation of an employment
discrimination statute. See Merton, supra note 3, at 423 (suggesting that paid research participation
may be a form of employment.).
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Following the foregoing reasoning, liability appears to be minimized when
there is adequate informed consent by the woman, which includes disclosure of
possible risks to the fetus (provided, of course, that there are no other negligent
actions by those in the research enterprise).84  In addition, the low incidence of
research injury and the difficulties in proving causation for research injury
minimize the likelihood of liability imposition.  Any assessment of liability expo-
sure, however, must be balanced against considerations of possible liability for
excluding women of childbearing age from clinical trials.85
B.  Tort Liability and Exclusion of Women of Childbearing Age from Clinical
Trials
Liability for excluding women from clinical trials has not been addressed
directly by the courts, but there is some tangential support in case law.  The po-
tential for liability for excluding women from clinical trials reflects a conceptual
shift among members of the research community and the public towards partici-
pation in research.  Historically, serving as a research subject was viewed as
benefiting others, sometimes at significant personal risk; federal policies there-
fore focused on protecting subjects’ rights and interests, and preventing abuse.
Today, participation often offers a high likelihood of direct medical benefit, and
participants now assert their “right” to enter a study.86  In addition, heightened
public awareness and concern about the potential impact of exclusion87 likely
will act to increase the probability of legal action.  The specter of liability falls
predominantly on the manufacturers of the experimental drugs.88
84. Note that liability can be great where it is determined that consent is inadequate or that
warnings were insufficient.  See Clayton, supra note 5, at 104.  If a child is born alive, and the mother
alleges that she would not have taken the drug or chosen not to bear the child had she known about
the risks, the child and the mother could assert claims for prenatal injury and economic and emo-
tional injury, or wrongful life and wrongful birth.  See id.  Claims brought by children for wrongful
life—a child is born alive, but the parents allege that more information would have led them to
avoid bearing children—have been denied almost universally by courts and legislatures.  See id.  If a
child was born alive, but the mother brings a claim asserting that she would have avoided child-
bearing if she had known more, the mother’s claim would be for wrongful birth, which has the po-
tential for large damage claims.  See id. at 105.  When a child is stillborn due to another’s negligence,
some jurisdictions permit the beneficiaries of the fetus’ estate, usually the parents, to bring an action
for wrongful death, although some states require that the fetus be viable at the time of the injury.
See id.  These claims usually result in a small amount of recovery, and many states refuse to allow
them altogether.  See id.  For further discussion of prenatal injury, wrongful birth, and wrongful life,
see KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 55, at 367.
85. See Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 94-96.
86. See id. at 92; Kass et al., supra note 3, at 41; see generally Kass, supra note 9, at 211 (manuscript
pages) (“[W]omen now . . . have greater ‘rights’ to research inclusion than ever before.”).
87. Reports about women’s exclusion from clinical research and the risks exclusion poses have
appeared in newspapers across the country.  See, e.g., Bob Condor, Rx for Women’s Health: FDA
Comes to Town with a Campaign to Teach Us How Medicines Affect Our Bodies, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1997,
at 1 (describing an FDA pilot program designed to explain to women that many drugs have not
been tested in women and how medication may affect them differently than it affects men);
Maureen Dobie, Clinical Drug Tests: Women Need Not Apply, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Jan. 22, 1996, at 15
(“Ignoring gender differences in body fat, hormones and muscle mass, early clinical trials here and
everywhere else rely disproportionately on data collected from men.”).
88. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 165 (noting that liability is an espe-
cially serious risk for manufacturers).
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Liability for exclusion may arise when a woman takes a drug or treatment
that was not tested on women but proves to be more dangerous or less effective
in women once the drug is on the market.89  The case law makes it clear that in-
adequate testing is a basis for imposition of liability on both negligence and strict
liability principles and courts have not hesitated to evaluate research design
critically and to scrutinize the activities of sponsors.90  For example, in West v.
Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc.,91 damages were awarded to a woman allegedly
injured as a result of using a tampon where the manufacturer failed to test the
product adequately.92  Similarly, in Taylor v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,93 the court
found that an oral contraceptive manufacturer’s potential negligence was a jury
question where the manufacturer failed to examine the causal relationship sug-
gested by studies showing that women with a particular blood type experienced
a disproportionate number of adverse reactions to the drug.94
Manufacturers are at risk under strict liability principles for defective prod-
uct design,95 and inadequate testing may be considered a design defect.96  In ad-
dition, manufacturers have a duty to warn about foreseeable risks that should
have been known, a requirement that can be met only with state-of-the-art prod-
uct testing.97  With the current state of knowledge and sensitivity to potential
physiological gender differences, an argument could be made that male-only
studies do not qualify as “state-of-the-art.”98  The protection afforded by the third
Restatement of Torts99 and by the second Restatement’s limitation may not be avail-
able: a manufacturer’s claim that a drug is unavoidably unsafe may be under-
89. See Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 94; see also Merton, supra note 3, at 419-22
(discussing the potential liability of a drug manufacturer for failing to test its products on women);
Rothenberg, supra note 5, at 1263 (explaining the potential liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers
for excluding women from clinical research).
90. In part, judicial scrutiny of the design and conduct of clinical trials may be traced to in-
creased regulatory control of the research process exercised by the FDA.  The statutory requirement
that new drug approval be based on “adequate and well-controlled investigations,” 21 U.S.C. §
355(d) (1994), has served to justify extensive oversight, from the form and numbers of trials needed
to who may participate and how records should be kept.  See generally Richard A. Merrill, The Archi-
tecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1777-88 (1996) (describing
the scope and practice of FDA’s clinical oversight).
91. 174 Cal. App. 3d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
92. See id. at 869.
93. 362 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
94. See id. at 297; see also Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984)
(awarding punitive damages where a manufacturer failed to conduct further studies after evidence
of adverse effects); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) (holding that a
manufacturer was negligent in failing to test a drug for teratogenic effects).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
96. See Merton, supra note 3, at 416-17; Rothenberg, supra note 5, at 1264.
97. See Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 95 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A cmt. j (1965)); see also Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1200 (Alaska 1992) (holding that a
defendant to a strict liability claim must show that risk was “scientifically unknowable at the time
the product was distributed to the plaintiff”).
98. See Flannery & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 95; Rothenberg, supra note 5, at 1264.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
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mined if it is not tested on women but nonetheless causes harm.100  A similar ar-
gument could be made concerning testing on women of childbearing age.
Women in clinical trials who are counseled personally about the known risks
and possibility of unknown risks of the drug to them and to their potential off-
spring probably are less likely to become pregnant while using the drug than
women in the general population who rely on warnings found in package inserts
proclaiming the unknown dangers in the event of pregnancy.  In terms of medi-
cal outcome, and, therefore, potential liability, it would be more effective to
monitor an unintended pregnancy and its outcome under controlled circum-
stances in a clinical trial setting than to allow a drug to be used by large numbers
of women in the general population.  The women who do not receive medical
monitoring and who suffer injury to themselves or to their offspring may be
more motivated to bring a legal action.  These actions likely will prove costly to
defend even if causation is not proven and no damages are awarded.101
IV.  COMPARATIVE ISSUES OF TORT LIABILITY: AZT AND DES
Are we destined to repeat the DES experience with AZT use by pregnant
women?  What risk of liability might there be in the use of AZT in research in-
volving pregnant women?  An examination and comparison of issues arising in
the use of DES and AZT follows.
A.  Transplacental Carcinogenicity and AZT
Studies indicate that AZT use by an HIV-infected woman during pregnancy
and by her infant after birth can reduce maternal-fetal transmission of HIV by up
to two-thirds.102  On the basis of such studies, the U.S. Public Health Service and
professional organizations have recommended that HIV-infected pregnant
100. An “unavoidably unsafe” product is one that is “quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use,” but which, when “properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
101. About 1000 women were included in the clinical trials of DES.  See Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 715.
That number is dwarfed, however, by the claims of over 1.5 million women who were affected by
DES in the clinical rather than the research context.  See Weitzner & Hirsh, supra note 54, at 148.  It is
worth noting that the DES manufacturers ignored the results from large scale clinical trials from as
early as the 1950s that indicated that the drug was ineffective; they also did not do any follow up
monitoring or reporting.  See id. at 147.  The cases concerning medical use of DES are based on neg-
ligence, strict liability, violation of express and implied warranties, false and fraudulent representa-
tions, misbranding of drugs in violation of federal law, conspiracy, and lack of consent.  See, e.g.,
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 926 (Cal. 1980).
102. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Effec-
tiveness in Disease and Injury Prevention: Zidovudine for the Prevention of HIV Transmission from Mother
to Infant, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 285 (1994); Pamela B. Matheson et al., Efficiency of
Antenatal Zidovudine in Reducing Perinatal Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1, 2 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 353 (1995); Rogers et al., supra note 12, at 78-80.  According to one study, 22.6%
of HIV-infected pregnant women who did not take AZT transmitted the virus to their offspring,
while only 7.6% of those who did take AZT transmitted the virus.  See Rhoda S. Sperling et al., Ma-
ternal Viral Load, Zidovudine Treatment, and the Risk of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Type 1 from Mother to Infant, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1622-23 (1996).
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women take AZT.103  Because scientists suspect that AZT might have carcino-
genic potential, there have been animal studies and follow-up studies in preg-
nant women and their offspring.104  No tumors have yet been observed in human
studies of approximately 1000 children who had been exposed to AZT in utero
and followed for an average of three years after birth.105  Preliminary results from
one animal study conducted by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) indicated
that very high doses of AZT during the third trimester of pregnancy increased
the risk of tumors in the liver, lungs, and reproductive organs in mouse off-
spring.106  Another mouse study utilized a different protocol and was conducted
by AZT’s manufacturer, Glaxo Wellcome.  The results of this study indicated
that AZT used during the course of pregnancy at somewhat higher doses than
would be used in current clinical practice in humans, but at significantly lower
levels than that of the NCI study, caused vaginal tumors in the offspring of mice
exposed to AZT throughout their lifetime and resulted in no increased risk of
cancer in the offspring of those mice exposed to AZT while pregnant.107
In January 1997, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) convened an inde-
pendent expert panel to review the data from these studies.108  The panel con-
cluded that the two animal studies were of “uncertain relevance” to humans.109
Nonetheless, the panel (1) identified the need for further research in this area,
and specified research priorities; (2) specified the need for counseling pregnant
women about the possible cancer risk in offspring in clinical trials and clinical
practice; (3) emphasized the need for long-term follow-up of all exposed off-
spring, including those who were not infected with HIV; and (4) recommended
reassessment of the Public Health Service’s clinical practice guidelines.110  Over-
all, the panel concluded that the “known benefits of AZT in preventing perinatal
transmission appear to far outweigh the hypothetical concerns of transplacental
carcinogenesis raised by the NCI mouse study.”111
B.  AZT versus DES
As AZT becomes accepted as the commonly-prescribed therapy for reduc-
ing the risk of perinatal HIV transmission, the potential for cancer in offspring
raises the specter of DES liability. The key factors that distinguish research expe-
rience with AZT in pregnant women from that of DES are (1) the drug’s purpose,
the woman’s health status, and the intended beneficiaries of the drug; (2) in the
103. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Rec-
ommendations of the U.S. Public Health Service Task Force on the Use of Zidovudine to Reduce Perinatal
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND REPORTS, Aug. 5, 1994, at 1, 1-20; Rogers et al., supra note 12, at 80-81.
104. See Office of Communications, National Inst. of Health, Fact Sheet: Summary of the Meeting of
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clinical trial, the woman’s consent, warnings of potential known and unknown
fetal risks, and monitoring and follow-up of the study population; and (3) in
clinical practice, the provision of warnings of potential risks to the woman
and/or fetus and notification of results of new research studies.112  The way in
which these factors are addressed likely will impact the potential liability for off-
spring injury.  Table 1 below briefly compares these factors with respect to the
use of AZT and DES by pregnant women in clinical trials and clinical practice.
When considered side-by-side, the contrast in the experience with DES and AZT
is stark.
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF DES AND AZT IN CLINICAL TRIALS





















Monitoring and follow up




Nob Yes, in animalsd
Clinical Practice:
Warning of potential risk
to woman and/or fetus
Nob Yesd
Clinical Practice:
Notification of results of
new studies?
Nob Yes, reassessing clinical
guidelines, alerting to
possible cancer risk d
Notes:
a.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  Note that the manufacturers ignored the results
from large scale clinical trials as early as the 1950s that indicated that the drug was ineffective for
this purpose.  See supra note 101.
b.  See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Mink v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see also Weitzner & Hirsch, supra note 54, at 146-47.
c.   This is presumed because informed consent is now a regulatory requirement of performing
research.  See supra note 44.
d.  These are all recommendations made by a review panel convened by the National Insti-
tutes of Health.  See Office of Communications, supra note 104.  The extent to which these recom-
mendations are being implemented is unclear.
112. See supra Parts III, IV.
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In light of the NIH panel’s recommendations, it is unclear how and whether
information about risks is being conveyed to pregnant women who formerly re-
ceived, or currently are receiving, AZT.  If information is not communicated
properly, it raises the potential for liability in negligence and strict liability.113  If
the recommendations concerning communication of risk and reevaluation of
clinical practice guidelines are in fact implemented, however, risks of liability
likely would be minimized in the case of AZT; the elements of consent, moni-
toring, additional research, and dissemination of information clearly distinguish
research experience with AZT in pregnant women from that of DES.
V.  LESSONS FROM DES FOR REDUCING POTENTIAL LIABILITY
Adverse reactions to experimental drugs and devices will occur despite the
best preclinical testing.114  Imposition of tort liability is just one approach to com-
pensate for these research-related injuries.115  Nationally recognized expert bod-
ies have recommended mandatory no-fault compensation systems116 and inclu-
sion of medical care reimbursement for research-related injuries in health care
reform efforts.117  Private approaches include contractual models and voluntary
adoption of compensation plans.118  These public policy alternatives, however,
are unlikely to be adopted in the near future, and private approaches are em-
ployed infrequently.119  Without alternatives, tort liability, or the threat thereof, is
left as the only realistic action for those seeking compensation for research inju-
ries.
There are at least three lessons to be learned from the liability experience
with DES that should be considered in addressing the tort liability barrier that
women of childbearing age face in accessing research and experimental thera-
pies.
113. See discussion supra Part II.
114. See 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 16, at 9.
115. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 243-52; Mariner, supra note 16, at 113-
26 (discussing various compensation models and their rationale).
116. See 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 16, at 113-49 (explaining the desirability of a no-fault
system and the various no-fault models); 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 169
(recommending that the NIH review current health care compensation systems with special atten-
tion to prenatal and preconceptual injuries to children resulting from parent’s participation in clini-
cal studies); see also ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 68, at 528-29
(referring to the recommendations of the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Compensating for Research Injuries: A Report
on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Programs to Redress Injuries Caused by Biomedical and
Behavioral Research).
117. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 169 (noting that the current health
care reimbursement system excludes coverage for medical expenses sustained during research, and
suggesting that a system of universal access with adequate coverage is needed for these costs).
118. Under the contractual model, the research institute agrees to pay for medical care and other
specific losses caused by research injuries in exchange for a waiver of the subjects right to sue.  See
Mariner, supra note 16, at 123.  Voluntary compensation plans include research institutes purchasing
liability insurance.  See id. at 123-24.
119. Most research institutions require research subjects to rely on medical insurance coverage to
reimburse costs that are incurred to treat research-related injuries.  See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH
RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 169.
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First, the risk of liability for including women of childbearing age in clinical trials
is quite small when compared to the potential for substantial liability when a drug is re-
leased into the general population and used by women of childbearing age without first
being tested on this group.  Clinical trial sponsors cannot escape the reach of tort
liability by excluding women of childbearing age from research; sponsors will
have to counterbalance liability exposure associated with offspring injury re-
sulting from inclusion of women of childbearing age in clinical trials with liabil-
ity exposure that arises when a drug is prescribed in clinical practice in a popu-
lation of women of childbearing age in whom the drug has not been tested
adequately.  Excluding these women and ignoring the possibility that they may
be, or may become, pregnant while taking a marketed drug is naive.  The nu-
merous legal actions, the number of women affected, and the magnitude of re-
covery for the clinical use of DES far exceeded that which arose from the re-
search use of DES or that which could have arisen had there been adequate
informed consent in the research studies.120
Second, early adverse event detection reduces the number of children who will be
exposed to the drug in the future, which will result in a corresponding reduction in the
magnitude of liability exposure.121  An argument could be made to support claims of
negligence and strict liability on grounds of failure to warn or failure to test ade-
quately and that risks to offspring based on a mother’s exposure to a particular
drug are reasonably foreseeable in the general population.122  This is especially
true where a drug is intended to preserve pregnancy and the health of the fetus
(DES) or to protect the health of the mother and the fetus (AZT), as one can ar-
gue that the “fetus can be seen as an intended beneficiary of the drug and a fore-
seeable victim of injury.”123  With strict liability claims, the sponsor will not be
responsible for such harms unless they were known at the time of distribution.124
If such adverse events are discovered quickly and are made public, fewer inju-
ries will occur in the future, and it is less likely that the sponsor will face a claim
that a reasonable drug company would have discovered the effects in offspring
earlier.  The difficulty is that the potential for mutagenic125 or  teratogenic126 ef-
fects may be low or may manifested only after a long latent period.127  At least
three steps could be taken to reduce liability exposure for offspring injury in
both the research and clinical use populations: (1) conduct animal reproductive
studies and continue these studies following drug distribution in the general
120. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Weitzner & Hirsh,
supra note 54, at 148.
121. As a matter of common sense, if the number of children exposed to a drug is reduced, the
number of potential plaintiffs also is reduced in the event that such a drug is determined to cause
injury.
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 1, 1997)
(“Drug and medical device manufacturers have responsibility to perform reasonable testing prior to
marketing a product and to discover risks and risk avoidance measures that such testing would re-
veal.”); see also id. illus. 2-3.
123. Mariner, supra note 16, at 119.
124. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
125. A mutagen is an “agent . . . that promotes a mutation.”  STEDMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY 1160
(20th ed. 1995).
126. A teratogen “causes abnormal fetal development.”  Id. at 1771.
127. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 167.
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population;128 (2) initiate long-term medical follow-up in offspring of clinical trial
participants who became pregnant during research participation;129 and (3) con-
tinue post-marketing surveillance in the general population of users.130  If such
efforts are undertaken, it would be difficult to argue that a reasonable drug
company could have discovered the effects in offspring earlier.131
These approaches raise practical issues in need of resolution.  Mechanisms
need to be developed to locate and to maintain long-term contact with study
participants and their offspring.  Pregnant women and women of childbearing
age should be notified of the potential for ongoing evaluation of their offspring
as part of the informed consent process when they are advised that long-term
and short-term risks to offspring are not yet known.  Steps need to be taken to
improve awareness of post-marketing surveillance efforts, including establishing
registries among HIV-infected pregnant women, their offspring, and their health
care providers.132  Locating offspring for post-trial and post-marketing surveil-
lance raises particularly vexing issues in the HIV-infected population: if a mother
succumbs to the disease, her children may be orphaned and difficult to locate.133
In addition, the demographics of HIV-infected women indicate that they and
their children may be less likely to have access to regular medical care that
would facilitate such follow-up.134
How does a sponsor determine the point at which scientific conclusions
from ongoing research and monitoring become foreseeable risks that would re-
quire a duty to warn clinical and research populations?135  This question is no dif-
ferent for harm that potentially may affect offspring than for any other affected
128. Current regulations do not require that animal reproduction studies be conducted for a
drug to be approved.  See Merton, supra note 3, at 66.
129. See Office of Communications, supra note 104 (recommending that researchers follow-up on
children exposed to AZT in utero).
130. See Ruth B. Merkatz, Women in Clinical Trials of New Drugs: A Change in Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Policy, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 292, 295 (1993) (recommending the “systemic collection of
postmarketing exposure data”).
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. g, illus. 2-3 (Proposed Final Draft
Apr. 1, 1997).
132. See Office of Communications, supra note 104 (recommending improved efforts to ensure
awareness of the industry-sponsored Antiretroviral Pregnancy Registry).
133. See Lawrence Wissow et al., Psychosocial Issues for Children Born to HIV-Infected Mothers, in
HIV, AIDS, AND CHILDBEARING 78, 87 (Ruth R. Faden & Nancy E. Kass eds., 1996) (noting that
“[c]hildren born into HIV-infected families face a greater than average risk that they will experience
the death of a parent or sibling”).
134. Rates of HIV and AIDS in women are highest in urban areas where access to care is limited.
See Lois Eldred & Richard Chaisson, The Clinical Course of HIV Infection in Women, in HIV, AIDS, AND
CHILDBEARING, supra note 133, at 15, 24.
135. One commentator has argued that “establishing surveillance systems, or requiring compa-
nies to keep track of and report adverse drug reactions, may provide plaintiffs with a source of evi-
dence that a company knew or should have known that a particular drug or dose level was poten-
tially dangerous and required further testing or a more adequate warning label.”  1 WOMEN AND
HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 167 (citing Jeffrey N. Giffs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug
Administration Regulation and Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194,
237-40 (1987)).  This is contrary to the common sense principle articulated herein that identifying
those who suffer adverse reactions as soon as possible limits potential liability because it limits the
number of actions a company eventually may be forced to defend.  See supra notes 120-30 and ac-
companying text.
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population, as experience with AZT points out.  As discussed earlier, an inde-
pendent panel of the National Institutes of Health was convened to review the
data from two animal studies.136  The panel stressed the need for counseling all
HIV-infected pregnant women in clinical practice or in clinical trials about the
risk of AZT treatment interventions, advocated a thorough reassessment of the
Public Health Service guidelines on the use of AZT to reduce the risk of perina-
tally-acquired HIV infection, and identified additional research priorities.137
Sponsors may not only want to conduct their own studies, but also may want to
convene independent panels to review data as it emerges to ensure that they are
meeting a reasonableness standard that will not be judged harshly in court.
Once a foreseeable risk is established, whether through post-trial or post-
marketing surveillance, the study and clinical population must be reached
through medical alerts and directives, which must be tailored to the population
that they are intended to benefit.  For example, sponsors should consider
whether the standard approaches through the “learned intermediary”138 are ac-
ceptable in light of the population using the drug.  HIV-infected women and
their offspring may not have access to regular medical care.139  Perhaps more im-
portant to minimizing liability exposure, strategies need to be developed to
identify and to notify the population of offspring exposed to AZT who may have
been orphaned at an early age and who were fortunate not to have contracted
the disease through perinatal transmission.  This population is likely to be lost
easily in follow-up.140
136. See Office of Communications, supra note 104.
137. See id.  The panel also concluded that there was a need for long-term follow up of all chil-
dren exposed in utero, including those who were not infected with HIV.  See id.
138. The “learned intermediary rule” is a common law doctrine holding that a physician, the
“learned intermediary” is responsible for providing a prospective patient with sufficient warning of
the risks attendant to using a drug.  The doctrine provides the drug’s manufacturer with a defense
against liability for failure to warn so long as the provider fully informs the physician of the drug’s
risks.  See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 225 (8th Cir. 1983); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir.
1975); Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1993); cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 96, at 688.
The rationale for the “learned intermediary rule” is as follows:
The obligation of a manufacturer to warn about risks attendant to the use of drugs and
medical devices that may be sold only pursuant to a health care provider’s prescription
traditionally has required warnings directed to the health care provider and not the pa-
tient.  The rationale supporting this “learned intermediary” rule is that only health care
professionals are in a position to understand the significance of the risks involved and to
assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given form of prescription-based
therapy.  The duty then devolves on the health care provider to supply to the patient such
information as is deemed appropriate under the circumstances so that the patient can
make an informed choice as to therapy. . . .  However, in certain limited therapeutic rela-
tionships the physician or other health care provider has a much diminished role as an
evaluator or decisionmaker.  In these instances it may be appropriate to impose on the
manufacturer the duty to warn the patient directly.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 1, 1997).
139. See Liza Solomon & Sylvia Cohn, Access To, and Utilization of, Health Services for HIV-Infected
Women, in HIV, AIDS, AND CHILDBEARING, supra note 133, at 96, 96-109.
140. Because AIDS is a leading cause of death among young women, a substantial number of
children become orphans within a few years of their mother’s diagnosis.  See Alfred Saah, The Epi-
demiology of HIV and AIDS in Women, in  HIV, AIDS, AND CHILDBEARING, supra note 133, at 1, 7
(noting that “[d]eath in this age group is particularly devastating to children who are orphaned”).
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Third, adequate warnings provided during the informed consent process should
greatly reduce the likelihood of recovery in a tort action.  General legal theories of li-
ability and case law in both the research and the clinical contexts indicate that
adequate informed consent is paramount to minimizing the risk of a successful
legal action for research injury.141  The Institute of Medicine’s Committee on the
Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies
provided comprehensive guidance on information that should be incorporated
into the informed consent process when women (and men) of reproductive age,
lactating women, and pregnant women participate in clinical trials.142  For
women and men of reproductive age, such information includes risks to repro-
duction and potential offspring, and, where appropriate, discussions of birth
control and pregnancy termination options.143  For lactating women, the consent
process includes the notification and identification, if possible, of risks to off-
spring.144  Finally, for pregnant women, adequate information includes evaluat-
ing risks and benefits to themselves, their pregnancies, and their potential off-
spring.145  Pregnant women also should be urged to consult their obstetrical care
providers before they participate.146  As with all research, an interactive consent
process with the potential research subject, rather than sole reliance on a signed
consent form, improves the meaningfulness and quality of the informed consent
process.147  These additional actions are important especially when the perception
of liability exposure is considered to be high.
It is disturbing that some informed consent processes lack even the mini-
mum of information described above.  One review of informed consent docu-
ments in thirty-six AIDS clinical trials indicated that only seventeen percent pro-
vided information about known teratogenic risk and that specific directions were
not provided should a pregnancy occur during the clinical trial.148  Because in-
stitutions, institutional review boards, and researchers could be held accountable
for missteps in the informed consent process, clinical trial sponsors have a strong
incentive to develop effective strategies to communicate this important informa-
tion to the research subjects through these other parties.
The potentially-significant benefit of these actions should not be underesti-
mated.  Studies outside the clinical trial context underscore the impact of good
communication between providers and patients in reducing the likelihood of
141. See supra Part III.
142. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 191-97.
143. See id. at 193-94.
144. See id. at 194.
145. See id. at 195-97.
146. See id. at 196.
147. See id. at 196-97 (describing an interactive process that might help a pregnant woman un-
derstand the risks of research); see also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 45, at 306-07 (“The key to
effective communication is to invite active participation by patients or subjects in the context of an
informational exchange.”).
148. See McGovern et al., supra note 48, at 103.
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malpractice claims.149  Although no studies have evaluated liability exposure re-
duction for research injury and the role of the relationship between the research
subject and the investigators, institutions, or sponsors, studies have indicated the
importance of the trust relationship between the subject and those conducting
studies in motivating people to participate in clinical studies.150  Building on and
solidifying this relationship may be valuable in reducing liability exposure for
research injury.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Tort liability for inclusion of women in clinical trials is just one of the po-
tential barriers hindering advances in women’s health, as well as the health of
society as a whole.  Earlier inclusion of women of childbearing age in HIV and
AIDS research would have prevented serious harm to women’s health and re-
duced the burden on the health care system of treating HIV-infected women,
their partners, and their children.151  In addition to balancing the risk of liability
for inclusion against liability for exclusion, steps can be taken to minimize liabil-
ity exposure.  It is imperative that follow-up studies in offspring and ongoing
monitoring be conducted and that information on risk be communicated imme-
diately to all those affected by participation in clinical trials.  While trials must be
constructed and monitored carefully in order to address the tort liability barrier,
the search for a cure simply cannot exclude women.
149. See Howard B. Beckman et al., The Doctor-Patient Relationship and Malpractice: Lessons from
Plaintiff Depositions, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1365, 1368 (1994) (suggesting that the probability
of a suit is increased by ineffective physician communication); Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-
Patient Communication: The Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and
Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553, 557 (1997) (indicating that communication affects the likelihood of mal-
practice claims against primary care physicians, although not against surgeons); Wendy Levinson,
Editorial, Physician-Patient Communication: A Key To Malpractice Prevention, 272 JAMA 1619, 1619-20
(1994) (citing multiple studies suggesting that breakdowns in communication between physician
and patient influence positively a patient’s decision to file a malpractice claim).
150. See Kass et al., supra note 11, at 25, 26; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION
EXPERIMENTS, supra note 68, at 459-81 (describing the attitudes of research subjects toward medical
research).
151. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Update: Perinatally Acquired HIV/AIDS—
United States, 1997, 278 JAMA 2135, 2135-36 (1997) (“Perinatal transmission of [HIV] accounts for
virtually all new HIV infections in children.”).
